Muslim Brotherhood Organizations in Germany

Key points

• Estimated numbers. The report puts at around 12,000 the number of people ideologically or organisationally linked to the network (2024), most of them belonging to the Turkish branch (Millî Görüş, estimated at around 10,000).
• A small leadership core. Beneath the appearance of independent organisations, the report describes a “control core” built around Ibrahim El-Zayat, linking the Arab branch (DMG) and the Turkish branch (IGMG).
• Financial architecture. The report places funding somewhere between internal donations, real-estate funds (Europe Trust, a complex in Berlin) and foreign contributions from the Gulf (Qatar, Kuwait) and Turkey.
• A rising following. The report cites the MOTRA 2024/25 survey: 45.1% of Muslims under 40 are reportedly classed as overt or latent Islamists, up from 22.3% in 2021.

1. The document and its publisher

The document examined is published by the Israeli Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism (May 2026, around 50 pages, in English) - the Israeli government ministry responsible for relations with diaspora Jewish communities and for combating antisemitism.

Its subject is the mapping of organisations the authors identify as affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Germany: their leadership core, their European and international relays, their funding and their public positions. Its scope is Germany first and foremost, extending to European structures (FIOE/CEM, FEMYSO) and actors in Qatar and Turkey.

Three definitions structure the text. The Muslim Brotherhood: an Islamist movement founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. Da‘wa: preaching and the call to Islam. Millî Görüş: a Turkish Islamist movement founded by Necmettin Erbakan, to which the IGMG belongs.

2. Methodology

The report is an institutional open-source analysis. It aggregates official German assessments, audience data and financial information in order to reconstruct the org chart of the network and its key figures.

• Type. An institutional analytical report based on open sources (open source).
• Official sources. Reports by Germany's domestic intelligence services: the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV) and the regional offices (LfV); parliamentary documents and debates.
• Open sources. German and international press, specialist websites, the organisations' social-media accounts, company and charity registers.
• Quantitative data. Membership estimates (BfV, 2024), social-media reach organisation by organisation, financial figures (Europe Trust, public funding) and the MOTRA 2024/25 survey (the MOTRA research network, linked to the Federal Criminal Police Office, BKA).
• Approach. Mapping of actors (organisations and individuals), analysis of personal and family ties, a survey of public positions, and tracing of financial flows.

3. Central thesis

The report argues that a set of organisations presenting themselves as independent religious and civil-society associations in fact operates as a coordinated mechanism, steered by a small group of officials - a “leadership core”. According to the authors, this network pursues a project of political Islam through a strategy of gradual, non-violent, “bottom-up” influence, based on education, da‘wa and institutional integration, while maintaining a moderate public profile.

The report contends that it maintains structural links with pan-European Brotherhood bodies and with actors in Qatar and Turkey, that it relies on a complex and resilient funding architecture, and that - despite the tightening of state surveillance since 7 October - it has undergone no substantial decline but rather a strategic repositioning.

4. The argumentative architecture

The report unfolds five chained demonstrations, organised around the pivot of the German Muslim Brotherhood network and its two branches (Arab and Turkish), and converging on the finding of a strategic repositioning. The diagram below sets out their overall structure.

4.1. A decentralised network organised around a small leadership core

What is demonstrated. That seemingly independent organisations in fact constitute a coordinated network, structured in two complementary branches (Arab and Turkish) and steered by a small group of key figures.

On what data. The report supports this with German services' membership estimates (BfV: around 1,450 people for the DMG in 2024, up from around 1,040 in 2019; around 10,000 for Millî Görüş), with the cross-referenced biographies of the leaders (the career paths of Ibrahim El-Zayat and Samir Falah from one organisation to another), with an inventory of overlapping positions at national and European level, with documented marital and family ties (the El-Zayat / Erbakan alliance) and with the geographical distribution of premises.

The author's interpretation. The author sees in this a “control core” concealed behind a façade of autonomy, ensuring, in their view, the organisational and ideological continuity of the network despite changes of names and structures.

The DMG (Deutsche Muslimische Gemeinschaft, formerly IGD) - Arab branch

• Status. Identified by Germany's security services as the central organisation of the country's Muslim Brotherhood network, operating, in their view, against the values of the democratic order; the BfV estimates its milieu at around 1,450 people.
• Origins. Founded in the late 1950s by Muslim Brotherhood officials exiled from the Middle East, foremost among them Said Ramadan, son-in-law of Hassan al-Banna, the movement's founder.
• Function. An informal umbrella organisation of mosques, associations and educational initiatives; da‘wa, religious education and the training of community cadres, without any public declaration of affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood.
• Incubator. Served as the matrix for affiliated structures (the MJD youth wing, imam training, institutes) and maintained continuity with the European bodies: the FIOE, which became the Council of European Muslims (CEM), and FEMYSO.
• Rebranding. The name change from IGD to DMG (2017–2018) and the move of the headquarters from Cologne to Berlin (2019), read by the services as a softening of image; the appeal against being listed in the security reports was withdrawn in 2021, with no ruling on the merits.
• Sidelining. Suspended in 2019 from the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD) after the controversy over its presumed affiliation; it nonetheless remains classed by the services as a central actor of the network.
• European anchoring. Regional intelligence (LfV) repeatedly describes it as the German branch of the FIOE/CEM and as one of its “key members”; Samir Falah, then president of the DMG, was elected president of the FIOE in 2018.

The IGMG / Millî Görüş - Turkish branch

• Status. Identified by the German services as a major Islamist organisation showing, in their view, ideological, structural and functional affinities with the Muslim Brotherhood's orientation; the Millî Görüş movement is estimated at around 10,000 supporters.
• Parent movement. Millî Görüş: a Turkish Islamist current founded by Necmettin Erbakan; the IGMG is its German branch and promotes a political-Islam agenda within Germany's Turkish community.
• Mode of action. Building closed community and religious spaces through education, da‘wa and infrastructure development; embedding within regional religious coalitions (Schura groups) and seeking influence in the public sphere.
• Relationship to violence. According to the report, its leadership refrained from clearly distancing itself from violent Islamist organisations and declined to designate Hamas as a terrorist organisation.
• Ties with Turkey. Institutional ties with Turkey and its Islamist currents: fund transfers and the employment of imams attached to the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet); a public meeting between president Kemal Ergün and President Erdoğan in November 2022.
• The El-Zayat / Erbakan hinge. Ibrahim El-Zayat, presented as the link between the Arab and Turkish networks, is married to Sabiha Erbakan (the movement's founding family) and sits on the Millî Görüş supervisory board; the report speaks of an “integrated system” between the El-Zayat and Erbakan families.
• European positioning. In 2026 FEMYSO identifies the IGMG's Turkish-German youth activity as one of its official branches; otherwise the IGMG keeps a certain distance from the pan-European Brotherhood institutions, which are more closely associated with Arab Islamists.

4.2. A legalistic strategy of “bottom-up” influence

What is demonstrated. That the network favours gradual, non-violent influence, through education, da‘wa and embedding within civic and institutional spaces.

On what data. The report draws on organisational genealogy (the DMG as the matrix of the MJD, the RIGD and the EIHW), on the chronology of the image change (renaming from IGD to DMG in 2017–2018, the move of the headquarters to Berlin in 2019, the withdrawal of the legal appeal in 2021) and on documented cases of institutional embedding (the career paths of Lydia Nofal and Mohamad Hajjaj via the Inssan association).

The author's interpretation. In the author's view, this “legalistic strategy” aims at long-term influence over society and institutions, through the building of community and educational infrastructure, while avoiding any public declaration of affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood.

4.3. European and international relays

What is demonstrated. That the German organisations form a continuum with the pan-European Brotherhood structures and with foreign state and charitable actors.

On what data. The report draws on institutional history (the IGD behind the founding of the FIOE in 1989, which became the Council of European Muslims in 2020), on the record of overlapping presidencies (Falah at the head of the FIOE in 2018), on the membership lists published by FEMYSO (2026), on public information about the IGMG–Turkey ties (the Ergün–Erdoğan meeting of November 2022, the employment of Diyanet imams) and on information about charitable funding from Qatar and Kuwait.

The author's interpretation. The author reads these overlaps as a mechanism of personal coordination between the national and European levels, and as the anchoring of the German network within a transnational movement.

4.4. An opaque, resilient funding architecture

What is demonstrated. That funding combines internal donations, real-estate investments and foreign contributions, within a structure that is hard to trace.

On what data. The report draws on charity and company registers (Europe Trust: assets estimated at over £8.5m, a real-estate complex in Berlin), on public decisions (the suspension of funding to Islamic Relief Deutschland in late 2020), on public-subsidy figures (over €1.37m for Inssan over a decade) and on the positions held by Ibrahim El-Zayat in financial bodies (Europe Trust, Islamic Relief Worldwide).

The author's interpretation. The author describes a “labyrinthine structure” ensuring economic resilience - real-estate income continuing to feed the network even if external funding is cut off - and complicating the tracing of flows.

4.5. A moderate public communication, occasionally contradicted

What is demonstrated. That the organisations display a moderate public profile, but that statements supporting terrorism appear from time to time.

On what data. Here the report relies on analysis of the organisations' accounts and websites (the volume and nature of posts), on dated screenshots (a video from the Bielefeld branch in May 2025, posts by Ferid Heider in February 2024 and February 2025) and on public statements by leaders (Kemal Ergün's remarks on 7 October, an article from April 2025).

The author's interpretation. In the author's view, the moderation on display reflects strategic prudence - an awareness of being watched - which does not, in their eyes, rule out the promotion of more radical agendas in less exposed spaces.

Israel, the Jews and Zionism: the report's findings, organisation by organisation

The report devotes an entire chapter to incitement against Jews, Israel and Zionism. Reviewing the organisations one by one, it paints a contrasting picture: from no hostile statements found (DMG, MJD) to explicit incitement (EIHW / Ferid Heider), intensified since 7 October.

• DMG. Limited digital activity and mostly religious content; the report finds no direct statements against Israel or Jews. A page devoted to Gaza calls for prayer, for giving through recognised humanitarian organisations and for the use of peaceful and lawful means; it refers in particular to the work of the historian Ilan Pappé and to the accounts of the Red Cross, the UN, UNRWA and the Israeli NGO B'Tselem.
• MJD. No overtly political or extremist content found: youth activities, workshops, volunteering and protest against anti-Muslim racism; a deliberate avoidance of political subjects.
• IGMG. A mixed picture. The organisation condemned the attack targeting Jews at Bondi Beach (Australia) and offered its condolences to the Jewish community. But its Bielefeld branch posted (May 2025) a video of the funeral of the perpetrator of a knife attack in Jerusalem, captioned “the martyr of Jerusalem”, with no condemnation from the leadership. Its president Kemal Ergün described 7 October as a “large-scale operation”, and an April 2025 article calls for “concrete action” against Israel.
• RIGD. No active social-media presence was identified.
• EIHW / Ferid Heider. The report focuses mainly on imam Ferid Heider, a contributor at the institute: according to it, Heider posted videos justifying 7 October and, on 5 February 2025, compared Israeli action to imperialism and colonialism, using the terms “occupation”, “population transfer” and “ethnic cleansing”; he is also said to have accused Israel of “war crimes” in Gaza.
• Overall trend. Since 7 October, the report notes a rise in rhetoric contesting the legitimacy of Israel's existence (“from the river to the sea”) and expressions of support for, or justification of, the attack, while stressing that the line between civilian aid and support for political infrastructure often remains blurred.

5. Directory of organisations and key figures

The report identifies the following organisations and individuals. The summaries below reproduce the characterisations as established by the report.

Central organisations of the network

• DMG (Deutsche Muslimische Gemeinschaft, formerly IGD). Umbrella of the Arab branch and, according to the German services, the central organisation of the network; da‘wa, education and cadre training (detailed in § 4.1).
• MJD (Muslimische Jugend in Deutschland). A youth organisation attached to the DMG; educational and community activities. A 2023 settlement with the BfV replaced the label “extremist organisation” with a mere “flagging on suspicion”.
• IGMG (Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş). Umbrella of the Turkish branch, attached to the Millî Görüş movement; political Islam within the Turkish community (detailed in § 4.1).
• RIGD (Rat der Imame und Gelehrten in Deutschland). A council of imams and scholars founded in Frankfurt in 2004; presented as the network's religious-legal authority (issuing fatwas); ties with the DMG and partial funding from Qatar Charity.
• EIHW (Europäisches Institut für Humanwissenschaften). An institute founded in Frankfurt in 2012; ideological and religious training of cadres and imams; affinity with the FIOE/CEM.

Funding bodies and relays

• Islamic Relief Deutschland (IRD). The German branch of Islamic Relief (Cologne, 1996); public funding suspended in late 2020 after the finding of “significant personal ties” with the movement; attached to the international Islamic Relief Worldwide network, designated unlawful in Israel.
• Europe Trust. A charity registered in the United Kingdom (1996); a real-estate investment arm (assets estimated at over £8.5m) holding a complex in Berlin; rental income redirected, according to the report, towards organisations of the movement.
• Inssan. A Berlin association (2002) fighting anti-Muslim racism; described as a strategic hub and a bridge to the establishment; ties with El-Zayat; over €1.37m in public funds over a decade.

Pro-Hamas axis (indirect connection to the network)

The report specifies that no direct link was identified between this axis and the Muslim Brotherhood network: the connection is said to be indirect, through funding entities.

• PGD (Palästinensische Gemeinde Deutschland). A Palestinian community classed as pro-Hamas; dismantled after 7 October.
• VPNK. Presented as the “successor organisation” to the PGD, concentrating the activity of Hamas supporters in Berlin.
• DPMG (Deutsch-Palästinensische Medizinische Gesellschaft). Collects donations for humanitarian campaigns in Gaza; backed by the PGD; according to the report, over $100,000 transferred since 7 October to the Gazan health organisation UHCC.

Key figures

• Ibrahim El-Zayat. Born in 1968 in Marburg, a German of Egyptian descent; presented as the central figure of the European Muslim Brotherhood networks. He led the DMG (2002–2010), was active in the FIOE, the IESH and FEMYSO; a board member of Islamic Relief Worldwide and Europe Trust; married to Sabiha Erbakan; sidelined from the ZMD in 2022. A former state (Land) security official called him the “spider weaving the web” of Islamist organisations (see the figure below).
• Samir Falah. A German of Tunisian descent, living in Berlin; president of the DMG (2010–2018) then of the FIOE/CEM (2018–2022); secretary-general of a European mosque-support body (around 300 mosques in Germany).
• Khallad Swaid. President of the DMG since 2018; former president of the MJD; has held positions in European bodies (FEMYSO); also a quality-management consultant.
• Taha Suleiman Amer. President of the RIGD and head of the da‘wa department at the CEM; a preacher and jurist of Egyptian origin, in Frankfurt; former academic director of the EIHW.
• Khaled Hanafy. Dean of the EIHW, deputy secretary-general of the ECFR (European Council for Fatwa and Research) and president of the fatwa committee in Germany; an Egyptian cleric; former president of the RIGD.
• Kemal Ergün. President of the IGMG since 2011; born in Turkey, arrived in Germany in the early 1990s; former imam of the IGMG central mosque in Frankfurt; received by President Erdoğan in 2022.
• Ferid Heider (imam). A contributor at the EIHW; member of the Fatwa Council in Germany since 2020; trained in institutions of the movement (Château-Chinon in France, the Frankfurt branch). According to the report, he posted videos justifying 7 October and describing Israeli action as “ethnic cleansing”.

6. The author's conclusion

• No decline. Despite the increased security pressure since 7 October, the author finds no substantial decline in the network's strength.
• Strategic repositioning. The author identifies the adoption of a moderate public discourse and a reduction in digital activity, intended to preserve institutional resilience and reduce friction with the authorities.
• Three axes of overlap. Infrastructure and funding (El-Zayat), European training and coordination (EIHW), legalistic local anchoring (Inssan).
• Recommendation. The author concludes that this activity must be monitored to prevent radicalisation and a possible slide into incitement or terrorism, while clearly distinguishing freedom of worship from its exploitation for purposes of political radicalisation.

Florence Bergeaud-Blackler
Anthropologist, Research Fellow at the CNRS (HDR)
Founding President of CERIF - European Centre for Research and Information on Brotherhood-style Islamism
cerif.eu